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Intelligence Memorandum

Background Maps for Possible Use in Considering Cease-fire Questions

(Prepared Jointly With the Departments
of State and Defense)

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25

14 July 1972
TS No. 199250

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
14 July 1972

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

BACKGROUND MAPS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN
CONSIDERING CEASE-FIRE QUESTIONS*

1. Under separate cover, each of this memorandum's recipients is being provided with eight maps of Indochina, or parts thereof. These maps should be regarded as analytic tools which may be useful in clarifying questions related to the concept of a cease-fire. These maps and their accompanying explanatory text (set forth below) relate only to considerations that might be involved in a "freeze"-type cease-fire designed to stop the fighting while the details of eventual settlement were hammered out in negotiations. The maps do not--repeat not--in any way attempt to depict geographic outlines of a political settlement.

2. It should also be borne in mind that while the maps contain the latest data available (as of 14 July 1972), in some instances the information is not completely current. Our information on the location of enemy military units in most cases is as of 10 July, but for certain units we have had to use data

**This memorandum and its associated maps have been prepared in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense. For reasons of security we have not attached the maps to the memorandum, and we suggest that they be stored separately. We have also put no titles on the maps which would indicate that they were prepared for possible use in cease-fire considerations. Instead, we have identified the maps only by number. All maps except Map No. 3 are classified TOP SECRET SENSITIVE. Map No. 3 is classified SECRET, for reasons which are explained in the text.*

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several weeks old. Our information on hamlets in South Vietnam which are wholly or largely controlled by the Communists is derived from data provided by the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) as of the end of May 1972, modified to take account of changes resulting from the present GVN counteroffensive in Quang Tri Province. If cease-fire negotiations actually begin, new editions of these maps would have to be produced as later information becomes available.

3. The maps are identified by number only, as follows:

MAP NO. 1: Present Areas of Direct Enemy Military Influence.

On a population density base map of Indochina, the magenta circles indicate where enemy main force (i.e., NVA) regiments were concentrated as of 10 July 1972. The larger circles have a fifteen-mile radius, and are centered on the location of the headquarters of each enemy main force division. The smaller circles have a five-mile radius, and are centered on the headquarters of each "independent" enemy regiment which is not subordinate to one of the divisions depicted by the larger circles. The dimensions of these circles are fairly arbitrary, but they do show in general terms the areas of Indochina where North Vietnamese military influence is the strongest.

MAP NO. 2: The "Pre-Invasion" Situation. This map delineates the minimum areas of South Vietnam and Cambodia that would have to be acknowledged as occupied or controlled by the enemy's main forces at the beginning of the North Vietnamese offensive on 30 March. In

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other words, this is the most favorable possible depiction of how things would look geographically if one argued for a withdrawal of invading NVA forces and a return to the pre-invasion situation. In Laos, this map depicts as enemy-held territory those areas held by the Communists at the time of the 1962 Laos settlement.

MAP NO. 3: South Vietnam: Enemy Main Force Positions and Hamlets Currently Under Communist Control--the "Tight Definition" Interpretation. This map, limited to South Vietnam, repeats the magenta circles showing where enemy main force units are concentrated, and also shows the location of all "V" hamlets (under the physical control of the Communists) as rated by the HES. This map is classified SECRET and, when removed from the rest of the package, it could be used to depict, with or without reference to a cease-fire, those minimum areas of South Vietnam which the Communists now physically control. The base map shows population densities and indicates in general terms the areas in which the Communists do, or do not, control significant numbers of people as well as territory.

MAP NO. 4: South Vietnam: Enemy Main Force Positions and Hamlets Where the Communists Have Control or a Predominant Influence--the "Looser Definition" Interpretation. This map contains the same information as Map No. 3, but shows in addition the location of all "E" hamlets (marginal or ineffective GVN presence as rated by the HES). Thus, this map also shows those areas of South Vietnam in which

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the Communists have a dominant position, but it loosens the criteria by including "E" hamlets. (It should be pointed out that both Maps No. 3 and No. 4 are, in one sense, misleading. Even in some areas with the heaviest concentration of "V" and "E" hamlets, there are a number of "A," "B," "C" and "D" hamlets which contain people and local governments loyal to and controlled by the GVN.)

MAP NO. 5: South Vietnam: How an In-Place Cease-fire Might Look Under the "Tight Definition" Interpretation.
This map assumes that the North Vietnamese troops which have invaded South Vietnam since 30 March do not leave the country under a cease-fire. The map again shows "V" rated hamlets, but it also shows a series of enclaves which represent the minimum areas which we could plausibly claim were all that the Communists were entitled to in an in-place cease-fire where their invasion troops remained in South Vietnam. This approach to a cease-fire does not incorporate a literal "freeze in place," since it does involve a concentration of enemy forces in areas the Communists are acknowledged to control (as of the map's information date). The required movement of enemy forces is relatively small, however, and the distances involved are fairly short (i.e., on the order of ten or twenty kilometers).

MAP NO. 6: South Vietnam: How an In-Place Cease-Fire Might Look Under the "Looser Definition" Interpretation.
This map is similar to Map No. 5,

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but it also shows "E" rated hamlets and provides more and larger enclaves to the Communists. For political reasons and in anticipation of GVN sensitivities, however, we have still excluded the areas immediately adjacent to Kontum and An Loc from the depicted enclaves.

MAP NO. 7: Indochina: How an Indochina-Wide In-Place Cease-Fire Might Look Under the "Tight" Interpretation. This map repeats, in summary form, the information on South Vietnam which appears on Map No. 5. In Cambodia, it allows the Communists a minimum of enclave areas consistent with their present disposition of forces. In Laos, it again divides the territory (as does Map No. 2) along the lines of the 1962 Laos Accords. Since the U.S. has often called for a return to the 1962 Accords, there is probably little alternative to this approach as the minimum U.S. position.

MAP NO. 8: Indochina: How an Indochina-Wide In-Place Cease-Fire Might Look Under the "Looser Definition" Interpretation. For South Vietnam, this map shows again, though in less detail, the "looser definition" interpretation which appears on Map No. 6. It also provides the Communists with a larger area for their enclaves in Cambodia. In Laos, we continue essentially to base the territorial division on the 1962 Geneva Accords. At the request of the Department of State, however, we have added a considerable portion of the Bolovens Plateau to the Communist side of the ledger.

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Comment

4. Maps No. 1 through No. 4 present basically factual information on the disposition of enemy military units in Indochina, the "pre-offensive" territory which we would recognize as occupied by the Communists, and those hamlets of South Vietnam totally or largely controlled by the Communists. Maps No. 5 through No. 8 present examples of how, under various assumptions, the temporary territorial allocations resulting from an in-place cease-fire might appear on a map. These latter maps are illustrative of different negotiating positions which we have been asked to present graphically. Their presentation here does not necessarily mean that the Departments which have participated in the preparation of these maps--or the Agency--endorse the negotiating positions implied therein.

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